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DDAS Accident Report 
Accident details 
Report date: 05/03/2011 Accident number: 641 
Accident time: 11:20 Accident Date: 10/10/2009 
Where it occurred: MF 322, Navy Deh 
village, Daman district, 
Kandahar Province 
Country: Afghanistan 
Primary cause: Field control 
inadequacy (?) 
Secondary cause: Management/control 
inadequacy (?) 
Class: Excavation accident Date of main report: Not recorded 
ID original source: OPS, 14/01-27 Name of source: UNMACCA 
Organisation: [Name removed]  
Mine/device: PMN AP blast Ground condition: hard 
rocks/stones 
Date record created:  Date  last modified: 05/03/2011 
No of victims: 1 No of documents: 1 
 
Map details 
Longitude:  Latitude:  
Alt. coord. system: Not recorded Coordinates fixed by:  
Map east:  Map north:  
Map scale:  Map series:  
Map edition:  Map sheet:  
Map name:   
 
Accident Notes 
inadequate investigation (?) 
use of pick (?) 
squatting/kneeling to excavate (?) 
inadequate training (?) 
non injurious accident (?) 
 
Accident report 
The only report of this accident that has been made available to date is a UNMACCA Lessons 
Learned Summary supplied as a PDF file.  Its conversion into a DDAS file has led to some 
1 
formatting being lost. Text in square brackets [ ] is editorial. This record will be revised as 
more information becomes available. 
The accident summary is reproduced below, edited for anonymity. 
 
Mine Action Coordination Centre of Afghanistan (MACCA) 
File: OPS, 14/01-27 
Date: 1st December 2009 
Subject: INVESTIGATION REPORT & LESSONS LEARNED OF [Demining group]-DT-16 
DEMINNG ACCIDENT  
Attached please find the investigation report and lessons learned of [Demining group] -DT-16 
demining accident occurred on 10 October 2009 in Navy Deh village, Daman district of 
Kandahar Province. 
 
LESSONS LEARNED SUMMARY OF [Demining group] DT-16 DMINING ACCIDENT 
INTRODUCTION: 
An investigation team was convened by the AMAC South to investigate the demining accident 
involving [the Victim] the Deminer of [Demining group] DT-16. The accident occurred at 11:20 
hours on 10 Oct 2009 at the minefield number AF/2402/211881MF 322, located in Navy Deh 
village, Daman district of Kandahar province. 
SUMMARY: 
MF # 322 is an anti-personal mine contaminated area, part of a big mine belt around 
Kandahar Airfield (KAF). The area was of great importance from the military point of view, so 
the Russian troops planted mines there to protect their positions from the attacks of 
Mujahedeen and secure the KAF. 
On 10 Oct 2009 at 11:20 hrs when [the Victim] deminer was working in his clearance lane 
with a pickaxe that suddenly an explosion happened. As per investigation report the deminer 
was using pickaxe instead of bayonet because the ground surface was hard. He started to 
prepare a trench by pickaxe from second reading marker for further investigation of the signal, 
but there was a stone in close vicinity of pinpointed spot and the deminer wanted to remove it, 
so his pickaxe might touched the PMN mine or the stone put extra pressure on the mine and 
the explosion happened. Fortunately the deminer was fully dressed with PPE while the 
accident happened; therefore, he did not receive any injuries, but the visor broken down. 
CONCLUSIONS: 
Almost all the accidents of [Demining group] in Southern area and some of them in central 
area are because of the improper use of pickaxe during the clearance operations. It is also 
concluded that the carelessness of deminers, lack of proper training on where and how to use 
the pickaxe and poor supervision the main are contributing factors to all these accidents. 
RECOMMENDATIONS: 
As the use of pickaxe and its relation with demining accidents is an issue now in [Demining 
group] teams, therefore, it is strongly recommended to [Demining group] operations and QA 
cell to review the use of pickaxe on whether to use the pickaxe in future operations or 
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completely remove it. If [Demining group] is going to continue with pickaxe, so they shall 
make sure that it is used according to the standard operating procedures. 
As the visor was broken down with the blast of a PMN mine, so it is also recommended to 
[Demining group] to conduct a trail on new visors and make sure that it can resist against 
blast mines from a specific distance i.e. between deminer's face and a hazard item during 
demining operations. 
MACCA OPS department is waiting to receive a written report from [Demining group] after 10 
days of distribution of this report. 
Victim Report 
Victim number: 824 Name: [Name removed] 
Age:  Gender: Male 
Status: deminer  Fit for work: yes 
Compensation: Not made available Time to hospital: Not made available 
Protection issued: Frontal apron 
Long visor 
Protection used: Frontal apron, Long 
visor 
 
Summary of injuries: 
COMMENT: No injuries recorded. No Medical report was made available. 
 
Analysis 
The primary cause of this accident is listed as a Field Control Inadequacy because the Victim 
was using a pickaxe to investigate a metal detector reading and his error was not corrected. 
The secondary cause is listed as a Management Control Inadequacy because the 
investigators imply that the use of the pickaxe is approved by the management when they 
recommend that its use be changed.  
The use of a pickaxe on hard ground in Afghanistan has been common since the early 1990s 
despite UN edicts intended to stop its use. The hard ground can make the bayonet (a 
common and inappropriate alternative) intolerably slow.  
Details of the broken visor were not provided, but 5mm polycarbonate visors are not able to 
survive a PMN mine blast without damage. If the visor protected the Victim’s face, it 
performed appropriately. 
The “Inadequate investigation” listed under notes refers to the absence of a full accident 
report. The UN supported MACCA has failed to make these widely available for some years 
in contravention of the requirements of the IMAS. The existence of the accident summary 
implies that the Afghan investigators did make a comprehensive report and the failure of the 
UN to share it with others is regrettable.   
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